分野別セミナー

Identity-based identification (IBI) schemes are generally insecure against reset attacks since they are commonly constructed from three-move Sigma-protocols similar those of traditional public-key identification schemes. In 2009, Thorncharoensri et al. proposed the first IBI scheme secure against impersonators who are able to perform concurrent-reset attacks and is the only scheme that satisfies this notion of security in literature to date. However, their scheme suffers from correctness issues and is also constructed using pairings, which are known to be costly operationally. In this paper, we utilize one of Bellare et al's methods to reinforce the Schnorr-IBI scheme (and also its more-secure variant: the Twin-Schnorr-IBI scheme) against reset attacks, therefore achieving reset-secure IBI schemes without pairings.


This talk is organized in collaboration with Sakurai Laboratory in Department of Informatics and Information Security Group in Institute of Systems, Information Technologies and Nanotechnologies.